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Lurie: Conscientious Objection: The Constitutional Questions

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS*
HoWARD

R. Lum"U*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Military Selective Service Act of 19671 exempts from combatant training and service in the armed forces any person "who, by
reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form."' Under this, and preceding similar
provisions, thousands of young men' have been exempted from military service because of their beliefs, while millions of other young
men-in spite of their beliefs-have been required to serve.
The Supreme Court has never held that the Constitution requires an exemption for conscientious objectors to war, nor has it
held that such an exemption is constitutionally prohibited. The decided cases dealing with the exemption apppear to have assumed that
it is a matter of legislative grace on the part of the Congress4 subject,
however, to constitutional limitations.' By judicially expanding the
scope of the statutory exemption through statutory interpretation, the
Court has avoided reaching the constitutional questions.6 Indeed, it
may be said that the Court has evaded the issue
* Note: The following article was written before the Supreme Court's
decision in Gillette v. United States and Negre v. Larsen, 91 S. Ct. 828 (1971),
was delivered. The judgment of the Court in those cases was that the conscientious objector exemption of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 is not
available to one who is sincerely opposed to participation only in a particular
war, i.e., the selective objector, even though that objection is the result of
religious training and belief. Following the Supreme Court's decision in these
cases, the author prepared an addendum to his article, "After Gillette and
Negre-Some Answers" which is printed infra at 156.
** Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.
A.B., 1960, West Virginia University; J.D., 1963 University of Michigan.
Member West Virginia and District of Columbia Bars.
150 App. U.S.C. § 451 et seq., 62 Stat. 604 as amended, 65 Stat. 75,
81 Stat. 100.
250 App. U.S.C. § 456(j), 81 Stat. 104 (1967).
'As of December 31, 1970, there were 28,188 registrants classified in
category I-0 (conscientious objector). Selective Service News 4 (February
1971). Not included in these figures are registrants classified in category
I-A-O (conscientious objectors willing to serve in a noncombatant capacity).
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623 (1931).
s United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1964).
6See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
7 See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970)
(concurring
opinion of Justice Harlan).
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The time may soon come, however, when the Court can no
longer refuse to confront the issue.' This article will examine the issue
with a view toward resolving the question.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 9
An exemption from military service for those whose religions
or religious beliefs presented for them a moral dilemma with respect
to obedience to the state or to their consciences is not without historical precedent.' The American Colonies dealt with the situation by
various means which were later perpetuated in their state statutes
and constitutions." By the time of the Civil War the exemption of
religious conscientious objectors from military service was an accepted concept. During the Civil War the responsibility for conscription
shifted from the states to the federal government. The Draft Law
of 1864 provided for noncombatant service for members of religious
denominations whose rules and articles of faith and practice prohibited
them from bearing arms.2 The Confederacy generally provided
parallel treatment for certain conscientious objectors.'* The First
World War saw the continuation of the exemption for certain religious conscientious objectors.' 4
The 1940 Selective Training and Service Act broadened the
World War I exemption by eliminating the requirement that the claimant belong to a pacifist religious sect so long as his opposition to war
was based on "religious training and belief."' 5 This expansion of the
exemption was a recognition of the fact that one could be religious
without belonging to a recognized church.' 6 The Act did not, however,
define or otherwise specify what was meant by "religious training and
belief." Two cases decided in the circuit courts between 1940 and
I On December 9, 1970, the Court heard argument in Gillette v. United
States, cert. granted, 399 U.S. 923 (1970); and Negre v. Larsen, cert.
granted, 399 U.S. 925 (1970). These cases raise the constitutional issue in

the setting of a "selective" conscientious objector case.
9A more extensive discussion of the historical background of the con-

scientious objector exemption can be found in Conklin, Conscientious
Objector Provisions: A View in Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 GEo. L.J
252, 256-263 (1963).
10 See J.REITHER, WORLD HISTORY AT A GLANCE 102 (1942).

11SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
OBJECTION 29-40 (1950); Hamilton
67 (concurring
opinion) (1934).
2
SELECTVE

SERVICE

OBJECTION
41-42 (1950).
3

SYSTEM

MONOGRAPH

No.

11,

CONSCIENTIOUS

MONOGRAPH

No.

11,

CONSCIENTIous

v. Board of Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 266-

1 Id.at 43-48.

14 United States v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521, 524 (2d Cir. 1943).

Is54 Stat. 889.
16See United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943); Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 795 (1946).
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1948 construed that language and reached different results. The Second Circuit in United States v. Kauten 7 construed the language
nontheistically as "a belief finding expression in a conscience which
categorically requires the believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept martyrdom in preference to transgressing its
tenents."'' That a belief in God was not necessary to the exemption
was reiterated in United States v. Badt.'9 Subsequently, the Ninth
Circuit in Berman v. United States" rejected the view of the Second
Circuit and construed the language in theistic terms to distinguish
"between a conscientious social belief, or a sincere devotion to a
high moralistic philosophy, and one based upon an individual's belief
in his responsibility to an authority higher and beyond any worldly
one."'" In the 1948 Universal Military Training and Service
Act,22 Congress defined "religious training and belief' to mean "an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relations, but does not
include essentially political, sociological or philosophical views or
a merely personal moral code. 22
Il. PRESENT INTERPRETATION
A literal reading of the statutory language of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act would seem to indicate a Congressional purpose to limit the exemption to those whose objection to
participation in war was "religious" in the traditional sense of the
word, which requires a belief "in a conventional God." 4 The constitutionality of the section was raised in United States v. Seeger,25
where it was argued that, so interpreted, the statute was unconstitutional under the first amendment's establishment and free exercise
clauses in that it did not exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors
and discriminated between different forms of religious expression in
violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Faced
with this constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court avoided it by
concluding that Congress meant the language "to embrace all re17
18

133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).

Id. at 708.

19 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944). See also United States v. Downer, 135
F.2d 521, 524 (2d Cir. 1943).
20 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
21 156 F.2d at 380.
50 App. U.S.C. § 451 et seq., 62 Stat. 612.
23 50 App. U.S.C. § 456(j), 62 Stat. 612.
24 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
22

2-5380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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ligions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views."26 Therefore, if a "sincere and meaningful" belief
"occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled
by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualified for the
exemption '27 it is a belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being"
and is "religious" under the statute. Belief "in a traditional God" is
not essential,2" and the belief need not be externally compelled or
derived.29
Having construed Seeger's beliefs to be in a relation to a Supreme Being, the Court was able to declare that Seeger's objection
to participation in war was based upon religious training and belief, and that he, therefore, qualified for the exemption.
It is doubtful that Congress really meant to exempt persons such
as Seeger, who was not religious in the traditional sense of the word,
and it appears that the Court stretched the statutory language to include him only to avoid the constitutional infirmities that his exclusion might present.
In its study of the Selective Service System in 1966-67 the
National Advisory Commission on Selective Service
considered the technical question of whether the statute
should be amended to assure as a matter of orderly form
that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the law as set
forth in the Seeger decision would be followed. But the
majority of the Commission concluded that since the Court
itself is the final authority for statutory interpretation, such
an amendment would be unnecessary.2
On the other hand, the Civilian Advisory Panel on Military
Manpower Procurement' reported to the House Committee on
Armed Services at about the same time that the Seeger decision
"unduly expanded the basis upon which individual registrants could
claim conscientious objections to military service." 2
26

Id. at
1d.at
Id. at
29
Id. at
30
27
28

THE

165.
176.
178.
186.

NATIONAL

ADVISORY

COMMISSION

ON

SELECTIVE

PURsUrr OF EQUITY: WHO SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE?

SERVICE,

IN

48 (1967).

31 CIVILIAN ADVISORY PANEL ON MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT,
ON ARMED SERVICES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
32 Id. at 13.
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3. The Supreme Court decision in the Seeger case appears
to ignore the intent of Congress which, in amending the
language of the 1940 Draft Act, attempted to narrow the
circumstances and more clearly define the basis for claiming conscientious objection to military service. The interpretation by the Court of the language added by Congress in this regard actually resulted in a significant broadening of the basis on which these claims can be made with
the very real possibility that in the future there will be an
ever-increasing number of unjustified appeals for exemption from military service.33
Reporting on the bill that was to become the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 the Conference Committee stated: "The Senate
conferees also concurred in the desire of the House language to more
narrowly construe the basis for classifying registrants as 'conscientious objectors.' ,'
The bill deleted the reference to a "Supreme Being" but continued the exclusion of "essentially political, sociological or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code." 35 If it was truly
the intent of Congress to limit the scope of the exemption 3 by deleting the "Supreme Being" language from the statute,3" the recent
case of Welsh v. United States 8 would seem to indicate that Congress has failed in its attempt. Welsh, decided in 1970 under the
1948 Act, is strikingly similar to Seeger.
33
1d.
34

at 14.
H.R. REP. No. 346, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. &ADMIN. NEWS, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1360 (1967).
35
36 S. 1432, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 7 (1967).
SELECTIVE

SERVICE SYSTEM,

LEGAL ASPECTS

OF SELECrIvE SERVICE

13 (1969).
37
The logic behind the deletion would be as follows: The exemption
runs in favor of those who oppose war as a result of religious training and
belief. Religious training and belief was defined to be a "belief in a relation
to a Supreme Being." Since the Supreme Court gave a very broad interpretation to a "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being," anything meeting that
test was, by definition, "religious" under the statute. By removing the
definition of "religious training and belief' Congress may have intended to
narrow its scope.
In syllogistic form, the argument is as follows: Let "A" be religious
training and belief; let "B" be a belief in a relation to a Supreme Being;
let "C" be Seeger's beliefs. Congress exempted from military service those
who were by virtue of "A" opposed to participation in war. "A" is defined
as "B." In Seeger the Court said "C" is "B," therefore, "C" is "A." If "B" is
the link between "C" and "A," Congress could have hoped to break the chain
by removing the link between "C" and "A."
38398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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Seeger's conscientious objector claim had been denied "solely
because it was not based upon a 'belief in a relation to a Supreme
Being.' """ The Supreme Court, therefore, addressed itself to that
specific question. Welsh's claim, however, was denied "because his
Appeal Board and the Department of Justice hearing officer 'could
find no religious basis for the registrant's belief, opinions, and convictions.' ,4o Welsh had not characterized his beliefs as religious, but
attributed them to his "readings in the fields of history and sociology."'" The Court42 did not, therefore, address itself to the question of whether or not Welsh's beliefs were in a relation to a Supreme
Being, which, if answered affirmatively, would, by definition, have
qualified his beliefs as religious. Rather, the Court went on to decide the question of the religious character of his beliefs as if the
Supreme Being clause were not in the Act.4'
In Welsh, the Court said that under Seeger a conscientious objector's opposition to war is "religious" within the meaning of section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, if it
stems from his "moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is
right and wrong and that these beliefs are held with the strength
of traditional religious convictions. '44 Even though an individual's
beliefs are purely ethical or moral in source and content, they function as a religion in his life if they "impose upon him a duty of
45
conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time.
Thus, the Court concluded, the "section exempts from military service all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, eth39
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 167 (1965).
40

Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 338 (1970).

41Id.
42

at 341.

There was no majority opinion in the Welsh case. Justice Black
delivered an opinion in which Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined.
Justice Harlan concurred in the result, and wrote a separate opinion. 398 U.S.
at 344. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Berger and Justice Stewart,
dissented. 398 U.S. at 367. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 398 U.S. at 344. For purposes of this article,
references to the "Court" in Welsh means the Black opinion.
43The Court of Appeals had likewise considered the case as though the
"Supreme Being" clause were not in the Act. "The facts and result of Seeger
at the Supreme Court level lead to only on conclusion: The Supreme Court
deleted the 'Supreme Being' clause from the statute . . . .We see no need
to consider the constitutionality of this clause because it was already sub
silentdo stricken from the statute and was so considered by the Department of
Justice in this case." Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir.
1968),
rev'd 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
44
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).
45
1d. at 340.
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ical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they
allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war."46
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
Welsh does not, unfortunately, answer the questions as to the
constitutionality of the conscientious objector exemption. If anything, it prolongs the agony of uncertainty.
Actually, there have been very few cases reaching the Supreme
Court involving conscientious objection,47 and few of these involved
registrants claiming the benefit of the exemption. So long as the
claimant could be fitted within the statutory exemption, there was
no need to pass upon the constitutional issues which have been
raised. In any event, those questions dealt only with whether the
apparent limitation upon the exemption was constitutional. By construing the statute so as to eliminate the apparent limitation, the
constitutional questions were avoided.
Because the statute has always provided a conscientious objector exemption, the Court has never been called upon to declare
that the first amendment requires it. And, so long as the statutory
provision is broad enough to encompass any claim that could be
made under an argument that exemption is constitutionally required,
there has been no need for the Court to reach the constitutional
questions. There are, however, several ways in which the constitutional questions could be raised. First, a question could arise if Congress, unhappy over the Court's expansion of the exemption, were
to abolish it, and a claim were made as a matter of constitutional
right. Second, a registrant could make a claim for exemption which
could not be fit within the statutory exemption. And, third, one
clearly not entitled to the exemption could challenge his induction
on the ground that the Act unconstitutionally exempts others.4"
46

47

1d. at 344.

Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger,

380 U.S. 163 (1965); Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955);
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); In re Summers, 325 U.S.
561 (1945); Hamilton v. Board of Regents of University of California, 293
U.S. 245 (1934); United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931); United
States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v. Schwimmer, 279

U.S. 48
644 (1929); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).

This possibility raises, of course, a difficult question of "standing."
"[O1ne to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard
to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to others or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional." United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960). How-

ever, where quotas must be met as they must under the Selective Service
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A. Is

AN EXEMPTION FOR RELIGIOUS CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT?

Religious objectors to war have always been exempt by statute.
Twice the Supreme Court, in cases in which the draft exemption
could not be employed, 49 refused to hold that an exemption for religious conscientious objectors was a constitutional right. In United
States v. Macintosh,50 it was expressly argued that "a citizen cannot
be forced and need not bear arms in a war if he has conscientious
religious scruples against doing so." 5' Calling the statement "astonishing," Justice Sutherland rejected it unequivocally:
The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to
bear arms in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him....
That body may grant or withhold the exemption as in its
wisdom it sees fit; and if it be withheld, the native-born
conscientious objector cannot successfully assert the privilege. No other conclusion is compatible with the well-nigh
limitless extent of the war powers . ..which include, by

necessary implication, the power, in the last extremity, to
compel the armed service of any citizen in the land, without regard to his objections or his views in respect of the
justice or morality of the particular war or of war in general.

2

"Sweeping as the foregoing quotation seems to be," said
Judge Wyzanski in United States v. Sisson,53
scheme, a registrant might be able to show, at least with respect to his local
board, that he would not have been called if a conscientious objector had
been 49
I-A.

United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); Hamilton v. Board

of Regents of University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934). Macintosh
involved a Canadian seeking to become a United States citizen. He refused
on grounds of conscience to promise in advance that he would bear arms in
defense of the United States unless he believed the war to be morally
justified. Hamilton involved students at the University of California who
challenged the power of the state to compel them to participate in ROTC
programs as a condition of attending the University. Neither of these cases
involved a registrant seeking a conscientious objector classification from the
Selective Service System.
50 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
51 Id. at 623.
62 Id. at 623-24.
53 297 F. Supp. 902, 907 (D.Mass. 1969), appeal dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction,399 U.S. 267 (1970).
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The sum of the matter is that a careful scholar could
conclude in 1969, as Professor Powell did in 1941, that
"Notwithstanding all judicial declarations, it has not been
actually decided that a conscientious objector, not within
any group exempted by Congress, can be put into the frontline trenches or put into the army where certain refusals to
54
obey orders may be punished by death."
Justice White's dissenting opinion in Welsh also suggests that the
answer is not yet in when he asserts that there are "substantial roots
in the Free Exercise Clause" 5 for the statutory exemption, and that
Congress may have granted it because in its view "to deny the exemption would violate the Free Exercise Clause or at least raise grave
problems in this respect."56 Unlike Justice Harlan, who unqualifiedly
stated in his concurring opinion "Congress, of course, could, entirely consistently with the requirements of the Constitution, eliminate all exemptions for conscientious objectors," ' Justice White
seemed to undermine the authority of Hamilton v. Board of Regents
of the University of California'8 and United States v. Macintosh 9
for that proposition, saying: "this Court is not alone in being obliged to construe the Constitution in the course of its work ... ""
Obviously, if the failure to provide an exemption for religious
conscientious objectors amounted to an interference with the free
exercise of religion, the granting of an exemption would not be an
establishment of religion. It could hardly be argued that Congress
was establishing religion when it provided by statute what was commanded by the Constitution. If there is a right to an exemption
based upon religious objection, and it is compelled by the free exercise clause, the exemption could be as narrow as the free exercise
clause requires without creating any establishment problems. Only
if Congress favored some religions or religious beliefs over other
religions or religious beliefs would problems arise.6 ' It was upon this
basis that the result in Seeger was justified.
54

ld. at 908.

55
5 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
6 Id. at 370 (dissenting opinion).
57

333, 372 (1970) (dissenting opinion).

1d. at 356 (concurring opinion).
58 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
59 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
61 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 370 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
61 "Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral
in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to
any religion or to the advocacy of no religion; and it may not aid, foster, or
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In Sherbert v. Verner 2 the Supreme Court held that an exemption on religious grounds was constitutionally required from a law
of general application so as not to interfere with the free exercise
of religion. The same reasoning could support a decision requiring
an exemption from combatant service for religious conscientious objectors. Indeed, it would appear that this rationale lay behind Judge
Wyzanski's decision in United States v. Sisson6 that to draft a man
for combat service contrary to his conscientious beliefs would
violate the first amendment. Less than two months before the Welsh
decision, the Supreme Court decided Walz v. Tax Commission ,
upholding the constitutionality of a property tax exemption for property used distinctively for religious purposes. This decision would
support the granting of an exemption even though the free exercise
clause might not compel it. Since the court of appeals in Welsh
could find no religious basis for his conscientious objector claim,
the Supreme Court could easily, if Sherbert v. Verner" would support a finding that an exemption was constitutionally required for religious objectors, have denied Welsh's claim. That the Court expanded the scope of the statutory exemption beyond parochial religious objection to encompass non-religious moral and ethical objection as well leads to the conclusion that the free exercise clause
does not, in the opinion of a majority of the Court, require an exemption for religious conscientious objectors.
B. Is

AN EXEMPTION LIMITED TO RELIGIOUS CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS A PROHIBITED ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION?

Justice Harlan quite clearly holds the opinion that an exemption limited to religious objectors to war is a prohibited establishment of religion. To him, the first amendment requires that in
matters of religion government must be wholly neutral. In his view,
the implementation of the neutrality principle requires
an equal protection mode of analysis. The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental catepiromote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the

itant opposite. The First Amendment mandates government neutrality
between religion and religion and religion and nonreligion." Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-4 (1968).

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
63297 F.Supp. 902 (D.Mass. 1969), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
64397 U.S. 664 (1970). For a discussion of Walz, see Kauper, The
Walz Decision: More on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 69
McH. L. REv. 179 (1970).
65 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
62
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gories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders. In
any particular case the critical question is whether the circumference of the legislation encircles a class so broad that
it can be fairly concluded that all groups that could be
thought to fall within the natural perimeter are included.6 6
In his view, a valid exemption "must encompass the class of individuals it purports to exclude,"67 i.e., anyone who is conscientiously
opposed to war.
The dissenters in Welsh, on the other hand, would not find an
establishment of religion in an exemption "from the draft for all
those who oppose war by reason of religious training and belief," 6
since such an exemption "has neither the primary purpose nor the
effect of furthering religion."6 9
Justice Black in the opinion of the Court did not expressly address himself to the establishment question. He avoided it by defining
"religious belief" in section 6(j) to include moral and ethical beliefs.
He sees no establishment problem because to him the statute provides what Justice Harlan says it violates the establishment clause for
not providing-an exemption for anyone who is conscientiously opposed to war. In Seeger, the Supreme Court defined the Supreme
Being clause broadly in order to avoid the constitutional infirmities
that would otherwise exist. Undoubtedly, Justice Black did the same
thing in Welsh for the same reason. If an exemption for objection to
war based on narrowly defined religious grounds were constitutional,
there would be no reason to avoid the question by construing the
language broadly. Without expressly saying so, it seems clear that
the Court is of the opinion that to limit the exemption to those whose
opposition to war is religious only in a traditional or parochial sense
of the word would be an invalid establishment of religion.
Justice White was obviously correct when he said that "surely
a statutory exemption for religionists required by the Free Exercise
Clause is not an invalid establishment because it fails to include
nonreligious believers as well.... ", However, that does not answer
the question of whether, if an exemption for religious believers is
v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 357 (1970), citing his concurring
66Welsh
opinion in Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970).
67Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 358 (1970) (concurring opinion).
at 369 (dissenting opinion).
681d.
69
Id. at 369 (dissenting opinion).
70
1d. at 370 (dissenting opinion).
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not required, it is an establishment of religion to provide it. Justice
White said, "the Establishment Clause as construed by this Court
unquestionably has independent significance; its function is not
wholly auxiliary to the Free Exercise Clause." 1 The Walz decision
certainly supports that position. However, Justice White does not
suggest any basis for drawing the line between religious and nonreligious objectors other than the free exercise clause.
White additionally commented that if an exemption for religious
objectors is an establishment of religion, it would not "be any less
an establishment if camouflaged by granting additional exemptions
for nonreligious, but 'moral' objectors to war.""2 Harlan, of course,
disagreed.
[T]he Court's expansive reading of "religion" in § 6(j)
does not, in my view, create an Establishment Clause
problem in that it exempts all sincere objectors but does
not exempt others, e.g., those who object to war on pragmatic grounds and contend that pragmatism is their creed.73
These comments are significant in that they may forecast the Court's
views on other questions discussed infra.
C.

Is AN EXEMPTION LIMITED TO CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS TO ALL WARS A PROHIBITED ESTABLISHMENT OF
RELIGION?

In addition to requiring that the opposition to war be "by reason
of religious training and belief," the Military Selective Service Act
provides that the objection be "to participation in war in any form."
This language has consistently been interpreted administratively to
mean that to qualify for the exemption one has to be opposed to
participation in all wars.74 Objection to participation in particular
wars only was not sufficient.7 5 Thus the exemption has not been
available to the "selective conscientious objector." The Supreme
Court has not yet ruled on this question, but it is expected to do so
76
in the current term.
71
72 Id.
Id.
73

at 373 (dissenting opinion).

at 370-71 (dissenting opinion).
1d. at 358, n.10 (concurring opinion).
74 See Local Board Memorandum No. 107, SEL. SERV. L. REP. 2200:16
(1970).
7
1 Kauten v. United States, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
76
Gillette v. United States, cert. granted, 399 U.S. 923 (1970); Negre v.
Larsen, cert. granted, 399 U.S. 925 (1970).
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The constitutional issue could, of course, be avoided if the
statute were to be construed to confer an exemption for selective
conscientious objection.77 It is only if the statute does not recognize
selective objection that a constitutional issue is raised."8
It is thought by many that selective objection is purely a political
objection.
[S]o-called selective pacifism is essentially a political question of support or nonsupport of a war and cannot be
judged in terms of special moral imperatives. Political opposition to a particular war should be expressed through
recognized democratic processes and should claim no special right of exemption from democratic decisions. 9
Others recognize that objection to a particular war can be the result
of religious, moral, or ethical beliefs. It cannot be denied that there
are many theologians who recognize the existence of a "Just War"
doctrine8" which permits its adherents to distinguish between moral
and immoral wars on an essentially religious basis. Many whose
views are religious only in the sense of Seeger, and others whose
views are religious, moral or ethical in the sense of Welsh, while not
claiming total pacifism, consider the present war in Vietnam to be
wrong and immoral. The character of their views is such that, if
opposed to all wars, they would clearly be entitled to the exemption.
If they are to be denied the exemption solely because they consider
the present war wrong, but are unwilling to condemn all war as
wrong, a very serious constitutional question is raised.8
In Seeger, "the Court construed the congressional intent as being
in 'keeping with its long-established policy of not picking and choos77 See United States v. Bowen, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3421, 3422 (N.D.
Calif.7 1969).
1 See United States v. Bowen, 2 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3421, 3422 (N.D.
Calif. 1969); United States v. McFadden, 309 F.Supp. 502 (N.D. Calif.

1970), appeal to United States Supreme Court pending. Contra, United
States7 9v. Neamand, 302 F.Supp. 1296 (M.D. Pa. 1969).

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON SELECTIVE
SERVICE, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WHO SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE? 50

(1967).

80 For a brief discussion of the "Just War" doctrine see Macgill, Selective
Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative Grace, 54 VA. L. REV.
1355, 1372-77 (1968). See also Potter, Conscientious Objection to Particular
Wars, 4 RELIGION AND TE PUBLIC ORiaR 44, 66-77 (1968).
81 See United States v. Bowen, 2 SEL. SERV. L. RP.
3421 (N.D.Calif.

1969); United States v. McFadden, 309 F.Supp. 502 (N.D. Calif. 1970),

appeal to United States Supreme Court pending; United States v. Neamand,
302 F.Supp. 1296 (M.D. Pa. 1969).
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ing among religious beliefs.' ,82 It is clear from the decided cases
that the Congress could not constitutionally limit the exemption to
members of certain churches.
For then those who embraced one religious faith rather
than another would be subject to penalties; and that kind
of discrimination . . . would violate the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. It would also result in a
denial of equal protection by preferring some religions
over others-an invidious discrimination that would run
3
afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
If the belief "all wars are wrong" is treated differently from
the belief "this war is wrong" it would imply that the substance of
a belief and not its character is the determining factor. Both beliefs
express a moral judgment, and are at least theoretically capable of
being characterized as moral, ethical, or religious. Therefore, the
only difference between total pacifism and selective pacifism is
content and not character.
If the statute draws a permissible distinction between religious
and nonreligious belief, and the conscientious objector exemption is
limited to religious objectors in recognition of free exercise values,
there seems to be no basis upon which to exclude the religious
selective objector from the exemption. Even if an exemption is not
compelled by the free exercise clause, and is not an establishment of
religion if conferred on religious objectors only, an equal protection
argument arises if the exemption is granted to total pacifists and
denied to religious selective objectors.8 4 If, however, the exemption
is not compelled by the free exercise clause, and a limitation of the
exemption to religious objectors would be an invalid establishment
of religion, then if the statute does not distinguish between religious
and nonreligious belief, and the only distinction is one of content and
not character, the only question is whether the content of the belief
is a permissible basis for distinction. In other words, if the distinction
between total and selective pacifism is not a distinction between
religious beliefs, the fact that the selective objection may be the result
of religious training and belief ceases to be relevant, and the denial
82Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 338 (1970),
citing United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 175 (1965).
11 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188 (1965) (concurring opinion
of Justice Douglas).
14 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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of the exemption to selective objectors is not a preference of one
religious belief over another.
D. Is AN EXEMPTION LIMITED TO CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS TO WAR A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION TO
POLITICAL OBJECTORS TO WAR?

The Military Selective Service Act 5 clearly excludes from the
conscientious objector exemption objection to war arising out of
"essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code." In Welsh, the Court said that this language
should not be read "to exclude those who hold strong beliefs about
our domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious
objection to participation in all wars is founded to a substantial
extent upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency." '
The Court emphasized that these exclusions are definitional and do
not restrict the category of persons who are conscientious objectors
by reason of "religious training and belief." 8 Once a registrant is
determined to be a "religious" conscientious objector within the
meaning of § 6(j), "it follows that his views cannot be 'essentially
political, sociological or philosophical.' Nor can they be a 'merely
personal moral code.'
It is clear that the religious, moral, or ethical objector to all war
is entitled to exemption under Seeger and Welsh. The political
objector is not. The ultimate question, of course, is whether Congress may constitutionally make such a distinction in conscripting for
war.
In the ultimate analysis, the exemption for conscientious objectors is a classification of individuals by government on the basis of
their beliefs for the purpose of measuring their obligations to the
State. The individual's beliefs are measured in three dimensions:
(1) content, (2) character, and (3) intensity. Apparently, only a
deeply held moral, ethical, or religious objection to war qualifies its
holder for the exemption.9"
85 50 App. U.S.C. § 456(j), 81 Stat. 104.

86 Welsh v.
87

United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342 (1970).

Id.at 342-43.
88 Id. at 343.
89 Id. at
90

(1970).

343.

See Local Board Memorandum No. 107,

SEL.
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Hypothetically, one may be opposed to participation in war
on religious (however defined) or nonreligious (defined to include
all that does not fit within the definition of "religious") grounds.
Justice White could find no constitutional impediment to granting
an exemption to the religious objector and withholding it from the
nonreligious objector. "It cannot be ignored," he said, "that the
'
Justice
First Amendment itself contains a religious classification."91
92
Harlan disagreed. For him, such a distinction amounted to an
improper establishment of religion. Had the statute provided what
the Court construed it to provide, Harlan would not find any establishment problem. An exemption of that scope would not be circumscribed by invalid criteria. The distinction then would not be between
religious (however defined) and nonreligious objection. The distinction would be purely secular. If the distinction is purely secular,
however, it must not violate the equal protection requirement incorporated in the due process clause. There must, therefore, be a
secular basis for granting the exemption to some and withholding it
from others.
Justice White suggested a secular reason for exempting some
objectors in his argument that the religious-nonreligious distinction
was valid.
In exempting religious conscientious objectors, Congress
was making one of two judgments, perhaps both. First,
§ 6(j) may represent a purely practical judgment that
religious objectors, however admirable, would be of no
more use in combat than many others unqualified for military service. Exemption was not extended to them to
further religious belief or practice but to limit military
service to those who were prepared to undertake the fighting which the armed services have to do. On this basis,
the exemption has neither the primary purpose nor the
effect of furthering religion. 93
An exemption for those who cannot and, regardless of the consequences, will not fight serves purely secular purposes.
However, if the purpose of the exemption is simply to separate
those who will not fight from those who will, the motivating factor
91Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970).
9 2

93

See p. 147, supra.
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 369 (1970).
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should not be significant so long as the psychological impact on the
individual is the same. Indeed, as a practical matter it may be
impossible to distinguish between moral, ethical, religious, or political beliefs. Political judgments are frequently the result of moral,
ethical, and even religious considerations. Welsh himself had great
difficulty in characterizing his views. 4 Evidently, it was the psychological impact upon him of his beliefs that determined the result,
for the Court of Appeals concluded that he had held them "with the
strength of more traditional religious convictions," ' and the Supreme
Court held this was sufficient. The important consideration seemed
to be whether the individuals' beliefs were such that they "would
give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a
' Harlan suggests that the test is really
part of an instrument of war."96
the sincerity or intensity of the objection to war.97 "Common experience teaches that among 'religious' individuals some are weak and
others strong adherents to tenets and this is no less true of individuals
whose lives are guided by personal ethical considerations." 9 The
threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case
is a question of fact. The validity of what the individual believes
cannot be questioned. "Men may believe what they cannot prove.
They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or
beliefs."9' 9 "Local Boards and courts.., are not free to reject beliefs
However, the
because they consider them 'incomprehensible.' "
boards are permitted to determine whether the belief is "truly
held,"' 0 ' and their decisions "made in conformity with the regulations
are final even though they may be erroneous. The question of the
jurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is no basis in
fact for the classification which it gave the registrant."'0 2
To permit an administrative agency such as the Selective Service
System Local Board to conduct an inquiry in "such an intensely
personal area"'0° as the inner recesses of a man's mind, and to make
conclusive findings of fact is, of course, a questionable practice. This
94See Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1091 (9th Cir. 1968)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Hamley).
95
96 Id. at 1081.
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970).
97
Id. at 358.
98

Id. at 358-59.

United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
"I United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-85 (1965).
Id. at 185.
102 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1946).
103 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965).

99

101
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is especially true in view of the regulations under which the System
operates, such as 32 C.F.R. section 1624.1(b), which denies to the
registrant the assistance of counsel at his personal appearance before
the Local Board which makes the crucial finding of fact.
The real question, however, is whether there is any justification
for allowing one man to escape military service because of his
reasons for concluding that he does not wish to participate in war
while denying escape to another because he reaches the same conclusion for different reasons. Unless the Constitution permits an
accommodation for religious views, there can be no justification for
distinguishing between the moral, ethical, or religious objector and
the political or pragmatic objector.
Ultimately, the question becomes: Is what a man believes important to government? If it is, there must be a reason that is constitutionally justifiable. If there is not, the belief, the reasons for it,
and the intensity with which it is held, should be irrelevant.
V. CONCLUSION
Expediency rather than compassion may be the true rationale
for the conscientious objector exemption. "Conscientious objectors
represent one of the smallest groups in the Selective Service System." ' 4 So long as their numbers were small and the available pool
of manpower so large that their loss was of little or no significance,
it may have been expedient to exempt those who would not participate in the military effort. It is doubtful that an exemption would
exist if the number who could qualify was very great. Compassion
rather than expediency may have dictated, however, that the conscientious objector should perform alternative service rather than
being sent to prison. Having chosen to show compassion, however,
the Congress may not show it to some and unconstitutionally withhold it from others.
If the conscientious objector exemption is compelled by the
free exercise clause for religious objectors, it is doubtful that it can
be withheld from the religious selective objector. Even if it is not
compelled by the free exercise clause, it would appear to be an unconstitutional establishment of religion or a denial of equal protec104 THE NATIONAL

PURsUrT OF EQUITr:

ADvIsoRY CoMMssIoN ON SELECTIVE SERVICE, IN
WHO SwRv2s WnEN NOT ALL SnRva? 48 (1967).
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tion if it did not extend to the religious selective objector, even if it
was not an establishment to confine it to religious objectors.
If it is an establishment to confine the exemption to religious
objectors to war, it seems doubtful that it could be denied to any
sincere objector to war without running afoul of the due process
clause as a denial of equal protection. Whether any limited exemption could be drafted that would survive constitutional challenge is
questionable. That the present statute fails to do so should be beyond
doubt.
Perhaps the answer is to abolish the exemption entirely and to
deal with the conscientious objector administratively through assignment to noncombatant tasks. To the conscientious objector, if to no
one else, it ought to be clear that it is a fiction to believe that one can
participate in the functioning of a nation at war without also participating in that war as much as the noncombatant in uniform.

ADDENDUM
AFTER Gillette AND Negre-SoME ANSWERS
In an eight to one decision,' the Supreme Court, in Gillette v.
United States and Negre v. Larsen,2 ended the steady expansion of
the conscientious objector exemption from military training and
service.
Gillette, a humanist, and Negre, a devout Catholic sought relief
from military service on the grounds that they were conscientiously
opposed to participation in the war in Vietnam.' Neither was
I Justice Black concurred in the judgment of the Court and in Part I
of the opinion of the Court. Justice Douglas dissented.
2 91 S. Ct. 828 (1971).
3 Gillette was convicted of failing to report for induction into the
armed forces. He defended on the ground that he should have been exempt
from induction as a conscientious objector. He expressed a willingness to
participate in a war of national defense or a war sponsored by the United
Nations as a peace-keeping measure, but considered the American military
operation in Vietnam "unjust". His conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. 420 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1970).
Negre sought a discharge from the Army as a conscientious objector
after receiving orders for Vietnam duty. He believed that he as a devout
Catholic had a duty to discriminate between "just" and "unjust" wars, and
to refuse to participate in "unjust" wars. He considered the Vietnam war to
be "unjust". His request for a discharge was refused, and he sought relief
by habeas corpus. The District Court denied relief and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. 418 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1969).
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opposed to war as such, or to all wars. Both claimed a statutory
and a constitutional right to be relieved of the duty of military service
on the grounds of their conscientious objection. The Court rejected
their claims.
As to their statutory claim the Court concluded that "a straightforward reading" of the statute "can bear but one meaning;" that the
exemption is limited to one who is conscientiously opposed "to participating personally in any war and all war."4 The statute recog5
nizes only "a claim of conscience running against war as such."
With respect to their constitutional claim the majority concluded,
in an opinion by Justice Marshall, 6 that: (1) a limitation of the
exemption to objectors to all wars is not an invalid establishment of
religion because it "does not discriminate on the basis of religious
affiliation or religious belief, apart of course from beliefs concerning
war,"7 but rather "serves a number of valid purposes having nothing
to do with a design to foster or favor any sect, religion, or cluster
of religions."' Furthermore, there are a number of "valid neutral
9
reasons . . . for limiting the exemption to objectors to all war,"

such as "the Government's need for manpower,'"" fair administration
of a "system for determining 'who serves when not all serve,'"..
and concern over opening "'the doors to a general theory of selective
disobedience to law,"' "and that the section therefore cannot be said
to reflect a religious preference."'" And (2) the conscription of
objectors to particular wars is not an interference with the free
exercise of religion, because the laws "are not designed to interfere
with any religious ritual or practice, and do not work a penalty
against any theological position."' 4 A fifth amendment argument
that the distinction embodied in the statute "between objectors to all
wars and objectors to particular wars-is arbitrary and capricious
and works an invidious discrimination" in violation of the "equal
protection" principles encompassed by the "due process" clause was
4 91 S. Ct. at 832.

5 ld. at 834.
6 Justice Black did not concur in this portion of the Court's opinion.
791 S. Ct. at 836.
8Id. at 837-838.

910Id. at 839.
ld.

11 Id.

12 Id. at 841.
13 Id. at 839.
14Id. at 842.
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found not to constitute an independent argument in the context of
the cases."5
The preceding article raised four constitutional questions regarding conscientious objection. It seems appropriate to review those
questions in light of Gillette and Negre.
A.

Is AN EXEMPTION FOR RELIGIOUS CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT?

Justice White, in his dissent in Welsh v. United States,' argued
that Congress could limit the conscientious objector exemption to
traditional religious objectors to all war because the exemption has
"substantial roots in the Free Exercise Clause,""7 and to deny the
exemption to religious objectors might, in the eyes of Congress,
"violate the Free Exercise Clause or at least raise grave problems in
this respect."' 8
If an exemption were constitutionally required for religious
objectors to war, Negre should have been entitled to claim it since
"the sincerity or the religious quality" of his views was unquestioned. 9 The Court, however, concluded that there are "governmental interests of a kind and weight sufficient to justify under the
Free Exercise Clause the impact of the conscription laws on those
who object to particular wars."2 The Court apparently felt constrained to add that "[w]e are not faced with the question whether
the Free Exercise Clause itself would require exemption of any class
other than objectors to particular wars,"2 1 but notes "that the Court
has previously suggested that relief for conscientious objectors is not
mandated by the Constitution."22 Indeed, it would be difficult to
justify a constitutional exemption for religious objectors to all wars,
but not for religious objectors to particular wars.
B. Is AN EXEMPTION LIMITED TO RELIGIOUS CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS A PROHIBITED ESTABLISHMENT OF

RELIGION?

It seems clear that the majority in Welsh was of the opinion
that to limit the exemption to those whose opposition to war is
5

Id. at 836, n.14.

398 U.S. 333 (1970).
Id. at 372.

16

7

181d. at 370.
S. Ct. at 831.
d. at 842.
21 Id. at 842, n.23.
19 91
20

221d.
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religious only in a traditional or parochial sense of the word would
be an invalid establishment of religion. Although the statute clearly
excludes from the exemption objection to war arising out of "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely
personal moral code,"2 the Court in Gillette and Negre did not decide
that "conscientious objection to a particular war necessarily falls
within" that excluded class.24 No distinction is drawn in these cases
on the basis of the nature of the objection to war. There is, therefore, no reason to reconsider this specific question at this time.
C. Is

AN EXEMPTION LIMITED TO CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS TO ALL WARS A PROHIBITED ESTABLISHMENT

OF RELIGION?

It was suggested in the preceding article that if the distinction
between those who were entitled to the conscientious objector exemption, and those who were not, was a distinction on the basis of
content of belief and not nature or character (i.e., religious versus
non-religious) of belief, no establishment problem would be raised
in denying the exemption to a religious selective objector even though
it was granted to the religious pacifist. Once it is clear that the
distinction is premised on the content and not the character of the
belief, in order to sustain the distinction, the Court need only find a
valid secular reason for the distinction in order to satisfy the equal
protection requirement of the due process clause.
In Gillette and Negre, however, Marshall did not take this
approach. He did not consider the "equal protection" argument to
be independent of the "establishment" argument, and did not, therefore, treat it at all. He looked to "neutral, secular reasons to justify
the line that Congress has drawn"25 only to sustain the exemption
against the "establishment" argument. Since the Court found that
there are neutral, secular reasons for exempting conscientious objectors the Court held that it is not an invalid establishment of religion.
The difficulty with Marshall's approach is that the valid neutral
reasons that satisfy the no-establishment requirement do not satisfy
the equal protection requirement.
Justice Marshall gave two reasons for the exemption which have
"nothing to do with a design to foster or favor any sect, religion, or
23 50 App. U.S.C. § 456(j).
24
2 91 S. Ct. at 835.
Sld. at 836, n.14
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cluster of religions."2 6 They were: (1) "considerations of a pragmatic nature, such as the hopelessness of converting a sincere conscientious objector into an effective fighting man,"'" and (2) the
duty to obey a "moral power higher than the State."' 8 Both of these
reasons, however, apply with equal strength to the sincere conscientious objector to a particular war as well as the objector to all wars,
and Marshall, himself, acknowledged this fact.29
Marshall did, however, assert that "valid neutral reasons exist
for limiting the exemption to objectors to all war."3 Foremost among
these is "the interest in maintaining a fair system for determining
'who serves when not all serve."' 3' Since opposition to a particular
war is more likely to be political than conscientious, there is danger
that the two kinds of objection could not fairly be distinguished."
This argument, of course, assumes that political objection does not
qualify for an exemption. The disqualification of political objection
can, no doubt, now be sustained on the grounds that it is necessarily
objection to a particular war. The validity of a distinction on the
basis of the content of beliefs should not be premised on grounds
of a difference in the character or nature of beliefs until the validity
of the distinction based on character is sustained.
Marshall also sustained the exclusion of the selective objector
from the exemption on the grounds that "it is difficult to know how
to judge the 'sincerity' of the objector's conclusion that the war
in toto is unjust and that any personal involvement would contravene
conscience and religion."33 But unless United States v. Ballard34 is
to be overruled on this point, the objector's conclusion that the war
is unjust is not open to question. No reason is given as to why it is
any more difficult to adjudicate the "sincerity" of a selective objector
than an objector to all war.
Ultimately, Marshall reached the government's contention that
the limits of the exemption "serve an overriding interest in protecting
the integrity of democratic decisionmaking against claims to individ26

Id. at 837-838.

27 1d. at
281 d.
29 id.

838.

30 1d. at 839.
31

Id.

321d.

33Id. at
34

840.

322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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ual noncompliance."35 Although the Court did not adopt that "interest" as the neutral and secular basis for the exemption,3 6 it did
conclude that fairness in conjunction with other valid concerns supports the Congressional decision that the objector to all war "has a
claim that is distinct enough and intense enough to justify special
status, while the objector to a particular war does not."3 Among
these other concerns are fears of opening "the doors to a general
theory of selective disobedience to law,"38 of weakening "the resolve
of those who otherwise would feel themselves bound to serve, '3 9 and
of "a mood of bitterness and cyncism" which "might corrode the
spirit of public service" if "it be thought that those who go to war
are chosen unfairly or capriciously."40
Valid as these other considerations may be, they do not suggest
an answer to the "equal protection" argument. They justify only a
limitation on the number of persons exempted and the manner of
exempting them. They provide no justification for exempting A but
not B.
D. Is

AN EXEMPTION LIMITED TO CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS TO WAR A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION TO
POLITICAL OBJECTORS TO WAR?

As indicated supra at 160, an affirmative answer to this
question is foreclosed by the decision in Gillette and Negre.
CONCLUSION
One can only participate in a real shooting war.4" Yet the gist
of Gillette and Negre is that an exemption from participation in that
real shooting war depends upon a present unwillingness to do the
impossible, i.e., fight in past wars or future hypothetical wars. A
sincere conscientious objection to participation in the one war that
matters is irrelevant.
The preceding article suggested that the conscientious objector
exemption should be abolished because there was no constitutional
basis upon which to sustain the statutory limitations. The result in
Gillette and Negre seems to justify that conclusion.
3s
36 91
1d.
37

1d.
38
39

S. Ct at 840-841.

at 841.

1d"

40 1d.

Id.

41

See Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385, 391 (1955).
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